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Revisiting Post-Election Violence
Hervé Maupeu
“Even rigging requires a little intelligence.” (Mwai
Kibaki, September 1988)1“The ultimate expression of
sovereignty largely resides in the power and capacity to
say who can live and who must die.” (A. Mbembe 2006,
p. 29)
1 For some time now, optimism over the third wave of democratization has died out. An
increasing number of authors remind us of the adverse effects of electoral democracies
that increased in the beginning of the 1990s. At the time, many hoped that a combination
of development and democracy, along with liberalism would lead to peace and general
prosperity. In many countries, however, it is violence, ethnic cleansing and authoritarian
reactions that seem to be the order of the day.
2 The  conflagration  of  violence  that  Kenya  experienced  between  December 2007  and
March 2008 was surprising, especially because Kenyan democracy was viewed as the most
successful in the region, particularly after the 2002 political transition. Moreover, Kenya
and Tanzania were the only countries in East Africa not to have undergone any major
armed conflict. At least they had not experienced devastating civil war like the rest of
their neighbours. Kenya’s political culture had certainly for a long time been more violent
than Tanzania’s. Nevertheless, social violence had escalated in Kenya since the return of
multi-party politics and the spread of non-regulated market economy. Thus, Amy Chua’s
general  contention  that  “the  worldwide  spread  of  the  free  market  and  democracy  is  an
important  cause  of  ethnic  violence,  a  factor  that  is  aggravating  hate  between  communities
throughout the non western world”2 seems to be a convincing illustration in contemporary
Kenya.  This  view,  largely  shared  by  anthropologists  such  as  Arjun  Appadurai  and
journalists such as Robert D. Kaplan,3 compels us to think about the particular nature of
capitalism  in  this  part  of  Africa  as  well  as  the  form  of  democracy  that  has  lately
established itself in order to understand the mechanisms that lead to violence. In this
case  there  were  serious  repercussions  (close  to  1,500 deaths  and  300,000 displaced
persons), commonly portrayed as pitting ethnic communities against each other.
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3 The  2007–2008  electoral  violence  will  be  discussed  by  first  introducing  the  main
analytical paradigms that gave rise to fear of political violence in the multi-party era in
Kenya. This means focusing on the political psyche in one part of Kenya, the Rift Valley.
The land policies established by the colonial and post-colonial systems under regimes
that employed different strategies created dynamics of exclusion, which are expressed
within a context of electoral democracy and capitalism among cronies. Until the last
general elections, the deadly effects of this ethno-nationalism had been largely confined
to  the  Rift  Valley.  However,  these  mechanisms  now tend  to  contaminate  the  whole
country, notably through inter-community relations in towns.
 
Paradigms for analysing the 2008 election violence
4 Three months after the crisis began many experts on Kenyan politics had already made
analytical arguments which will  probably be analysed in future academic papers. The
speed with which views were expressed is unusual in this field.4 It certainly corresponds
to advancement in political science that is adapting to new forms of communication. The
various types of media seek insight from researchers and internet websites, particularly
current platforms that  make more complex expression possible than interviews with
journalists.  This is the particularly the case in Open Democracy that seems to be the
website of choice for most Kenyan experts.
5 The interpretation of the Kenyan crisis was varied, questioning the majority syndrome of
the Western media that was unanimous in a voyeuristic fascination they portrayed as
irrational  barbarism.  However,  as  explained  by  Madeleine  Bunting,  the  illustrious
Guardian columnist, “The violence in Kenya may be atrocious, but it is not ‘unfounded savagery.’
”5 The tendency not to search for the social (or historical) causes of this violence would be
less  attributable  to  a  certain level  of  intellectual  laziness  than to  unconscious  racist
clichés based on how the North views countries in the South. Academic analyses inoculate
us from this danger. Obviously, their approaches vary but all things considered, they are
mostly complementary.
6 The election violence led to several studies in Kenya. These were mostly carried out by
human rights NGOs, which are very well-established in the country, and had interest in
the  topic.  From the  social  studies  point  of  view,  they  made  the  notion  of  “election
violence” appears to be an operational concept, especially when they defined it precisely
and in a way that made relevant analysis possible. The Central Depository Unit’s (CDU)
definition is one of the most interesting approaches. It views electoral violence as
Any act  or set  of  acts  that harm or threatens to harm individuals  or groups of
people, to cause some damage to property; if the acts or the sets of acts are aimed at
or have the effect of manipulation on the choice or the election results. The damage
caused can be physical, psychological or both. Election violence can occur before,
during or after an election.6
7 In their  approach,  these activists  do not  distinguish pre-election violence from post-
election violence. Their definition is based on their observation that the cycle of political
violence often begins  before  elections  and does  not  end after  that,  even though the
person behind the problem has been elected. This leads to the CDU’s assertion that: “
Elections not only concern the campaigns and the polling day alone. The electoral process is a cycle
that lasts the whole period of a government’s stay in power.”7 This extensive view of election
violence is highly applicable to Kenya. Nevertheless, it does not mean confusing political
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violence  and  election  violence  as  the  same  concept.  A  study of  the  tensions  at  the
beginning of 2008 will reveal that some conflicts were rekindled during the elections but
the issues had nothing to do with the polls. The number of deaths in these areas and
during the election period is substantially the same as that registered over the past few
years.
8 The human rights NGOs also demonstrated the wide variety of election violence that are
expressed in various ways such as
… murders, murder attempts, confinement, aggression, threats of violence, torture,
arson,  rape,  sexual  harassment,  abduction,  obstruction,  looting,  threats,
intimidation,  hate  speech  and  slander.  Others  are:  insults,  political  treachery,
embezzlement, destruction of property, damage to property, economic oppression,
sabotage, evictions, closure of the political party offices or campaign offices, violent
disruption  of  public  rallies  or  campaign  meetings,  including  sudden  change  of
venues of such meeting by the authorities.8
9 Beyond simply showing the repertoire of practices, this list also reveals the multiplicity of
methods used by politicians.
10 NGO  analyses  are  based  on  an  analytical  focus  that  is  first  and  foremost  neo-
institutionalist  in  nature.  They  have  a  pragmatic  approach  in  the  sense  that  they
constitute  “applied”  social  studies.  This  makes  them  carry  out  research  on  the
institutions that are important social actors because their objective is to suggest changes
and if possible, improvements in the functioning of these institutions. In this sense, these
advocates (they are often law graduates) do not have a strictly normative approach even
though they manage to come up with recommendations that are mainly (but not only)
legal. Looking at the 2008 political violence, the interest in using their approach becomes
clear. Their work on the 2002 elections heralded difficulties related to the 2007 elections.
The  CDU emphasized  that  institutional  inconsistencies  of  political  parties  which  are
basically  mere  election  machines  activated  during  campaigns,  creates  favourable
conditions to primary elections that are often chaotic and violent. It denounced the ECK’s
modus  operandi,  showing  clearly  that  it  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  organize  the
elections.9 In  December 2007,  the  rigging  took  place  in  ECK  offices.  The  CDU  also
highlighted the autocratic culture within the Kenya Police, which lacks professionalism
and is propped up by a legal framework that does not define election violence. Election
violence is therefore a matter of the general law, particularly the general penal code,
which leaves a lot of leeway (and room for interpretation) for the security forces.
11 Nevertheless, the NGOs’ neo-institutionalism perhaps assigns too much influence to the
law than it really has. This voluntarism, believing in the impact of the government on the
rule of law, is not necessarily naive. However, it reduces the analytical focus because the
institutions do not explain the whole crisis and will not be able to resolve the observed
problems on their own. This is insofar as Kenya is a political system where the State still
has weak institutions (even though it is the most structured and effective State in the
region).
12 The analysts did not foresee the crisis that followed the elections of 2007. The failure of
the political transition was surprising because it was thought (or one would have wanted
to believe) that the political class had really been converted to a culture of democracy.
The intensity of the violence also took observers by surprise. Political experts now focus
on the existing dynamics that were sometimes barely visible but which facilitated or
precipitated the crisis. The NGO analyses of the election violence show this approach.
Revisiting Post-Election Violence
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 38 | 2008
3
Nevertheless, until specialists on Kenya who have commented on the situation show that,
even amidst the hue and cry over the crisis, the varied approaches could prove to be
illuminating.
13 First, there are those who point to external explanations and in particular those that
favour the view of the white man’s guilt. Caroline Elkins10 states that “whereas hundreds of
thousands of Kenyans fled their homes and hundreds died, the Great Britain takes part of the blame
for its imperialist policies.” She thus revisits the views she held during debate on her work
on the repression of Mau Mau11 fighters. According to her, the colonial government left a
legacy of an autocratic political culture, which is the direct cause of the current ethnic
tension  because  it  fossilized  heterogeneous  groups  of  individuals  in  closed  ethnic
communities and pitted them against each other due to its divide and rule policies. Her
analysis points out the carving out of the electoral constituencies along ethnic lines and
that the political  class is  a direct legacy of  the colonial  era.  This has been perfected
through the government’s approach. Nevertheless, C. Elkins analyses largely draw from
the Anglo-Saxon debates on post-colonial issues. Her views probably make it possible to
understand certain dynamics of Western imperialism and lead the Northern States to
assume their historicity and perhaps the debts incurred in relation to the South, as well
as to understand the particularities of contemporary African States.
14 Michael Holman12 holds a view close to C. Elkins’. He questions the Western countries and
NGOs which all along supported M. Kibaki’s government when financial scandals were
exposed and evidence of high-level corruption had been gathered. Thus, they approved
the ills of a regime that led to the major crisis that Kenya is currently experiencing. The
issue  of  responsibility  should  be  raised.  Wanyama  Masinde13 has  already  published
reflections on possible ways of resolving the crisis. According to him, the management of
the postcrisis period demands a search for those responsible for the crisis and legal action
against the guilty parties who are part and parcel of the Kenyan political class. He once
again goes through an analysis of the country’s internal dynamics without hiding behind
exogenous causes.
15 Gérard Prunier14 develops a framework of complex analysis that begins by highlighting
the Kenyatta era (1963–1978) as the matrix of the national political system that M. Kibaki
largely reactivated following the long interlude of the Moi era (1978–2002).
From Kenyatta’s time, the deal was simple: the Kikuyu and their small sub-tribes,
after having reached an agreement with the minority ethnic groups, took control of
everything.  The  Luos,  who  sought  to  modify  this  order  of  things,  were
marginalized, while the prudent Luhyias watched.
16 G.  Prunier  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Kibaki  team,  which  was  elected  to
implement the far-reaching reforms, principally crystallized the idea that it was seeking
to first Kikuyunise the State and did not aspire to equitably share the fruits of growth.
This  led  to  a  more  anti-establishment  than  anti-Kikuyu  majority  vote  during  the
elections. The analysis of the socio-political context leads him to evaluate the nature of
the outbreak of violence that followed the vote: “political violence should be considered both
ethnic and socio-economic.” In fact,  the diagnosis made by all  other experts on Kenyan
states this claim while highlighting the two dimensions, and demonstrating how they
function, which G. Prunier hardly done.
17 Aggrey Omondi15 says:
… the cause of the problem is neither tribalism nor politics (whose role is solely
incitement), but rather a long simmering history of glaring poverty and despair,
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which has  now reached a  boiling point  with a  generation of  young Kenyans  to
whom basic opportunities have been denied.
18 His analysis, rather brief in some aspects, has the merit of emphasizing the role of the
youth but even then, he only views one part of problem when he emphasizes that young
men found an opportunity to express their  economic frustrations through the crisis.
These young people  must  first  and foremost  be perceived as  social  cadets  who hold
important means of pressure through the militias that organize them.
19 The last open forum on the Kenyan crisis highlighted the ills  of  ethnicity.  Angelique
Haugerud16 believes that political ethnicity does not determine political development but
constitutes  a  contingency  of  uncertainties.  By  this  she  means  that  the  content  of
ethnicities can evolve. She takes a peek into the future by expressing the wish for these
identities to depend more on the reciprocities of  everyday life,  which will  make it  a
collaborative  issue  rather  than  pit  two  groups  against  each  other.  However,  some
negative  dynamics  weigh against  and impede this  evolution:  the  divide  between the
political elite and ordinary citizens, the inequalities between those who still have a roof
over their heads and those who have been dispossessed, and finally, the tension between
what can qualify as electoral democracy and what corresponds to substantial democracy.
20 John Lonsdale17 bases his appreciation of the Kenyan crisis on a very classic analysis of
the structural functioning of political competition. Power-sharing of State authority is
governed by rivalries between ethnic groups and within the ethnic entities through a
vision of responsibility on the part of elected leaders in relation to the community. These
two dynamics are complementary. However, this extractive approach to politics, which
Jomo Kenyatta broke, increased the difficulties the Moi regime faced and which the M.
Kibaki  team must  now manage.  Lonsdale  explains  to  us  this  new equation  with  his
habitual finesse:
The fierceness of the competition for sharing of State power became more intense
with time - as far as the population increased, and while the abundant showers of
opportunities in post-colonial Africanisation had long stopped, the conditions of
exchange for primary needs had proved to be bitter. It would have been quite easy
for  Kenyatta  to  guarantee  that  everyone  has  their  turn  ‘to  eat’  through ethnic
coalitions on which parliamentary majority depended.
21 It  was  more difficult  for  Moi.  As  the list  of  political  interests  grew,  it  became more
tempting to attract and to reward one’s ethnic supporters with opportunities to grab
resources at  the expense of  those who had now become tribal  rivals for land,  urban
property, or the small enterprises. With every “bought” election, anger mounted among
Kenyan citizens to the point that they piled pressure for constitutional change that would
have strengthened parliament, to the detriment of the presidency.
22 Thus, the current crisis is a result of the ills of “politicized tribalism,” the principal means
of winning post-colonial State power, which is less viable than before but remains the
most important means to riches.
23 It  is  observed  that  these  very  first  studies  on  the  Kenyan  crisis  principally  aim  to
understand the causes of tension, particularly historical dynamics that led to the current
situation. In the meantime, these researchers are not interested in the forms in which the
violence manifested itself,  the protagonists or in its geographical spread. Besides, the
factors—especially the economic ones—behind the outbreak of violence have hardly been
analyzed,  as  if  it  was  the exclusive duty of  human rights  NGOs,  which have already
published voluminous reports.18
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Factors behind the violent protests over official
election results
24 Since the return of multi-party politics, the results of three out of four general elections
have  been  contested  by  losers.  Nevertheless,  these  accusations  of  rigging  did  not
degenerate into an outbreak of large- scale violence like in 2007–2008. It is true the 1992
and 1997 elections led to post-election violence, but there were never perceived to have
characteristics of a civil war. The nation and the State did not seem to be in contention.
How different are the 2007 conditions from those of 1992 and 1997?
 
Elections under high tension
25 Electoral  fraud  has  been  widely  practiced  since  the  introduction  of  elections  in  the
colonial  era.  The  return of  multi-party  politics  enhanced the  chances  of  rigging the
outcome of elections. In this context, between the opposition and the majority, those in
government have a lot more means and opportunities at their disposal, since they control
the local administration as well as the police.  The 2007 election clearly indicated the
advantage that  the incumbent has.  Thus,  all  the bodies that  monitored the elections
showed that some rigging affected ODM (Orange Democratic Movement) areas, but the
rigging  was  apparently  much  more  massive  in  constituencies  where  PNU  (Party  of
National Unity) had the upper hand. The ECK staff seems to have played an important
role in this rigging, both at local and national level. The commissioners appointed in 2007
by the President without consulting the opposition, as was the practice since 1997, were
hence accused of abuse of office.
26 These  excesses  were  nothing  new.  International  observers  who  monitored  the  1992
elections  considered  them  marred  by  numerous  intimidations  and  rigging.  In  1997,
European  observers,  before  assessing  the  fairness  of  the  election,  were  obliged  to
reconsider their stand to enable Northern States endorse the official results. After these
two elections, losers denounced rigging that led to fraudulent results.
27 In 1992, the opposition garnered more votes than the incumbent but, since they were
divided  in  the  struggle,  President  Moi  and  KANU  (Kenya  African  National  Union)
garnered a higher number of votes.  KANU managed to unite the small ethnic groups
against the threat of a dictatorship from a possible alliance between the Luo (represented
in the presidential election by Oginga Odinga) and the Kikuyu, who had two candidates—
Kenneth Matiba and M. Kibaki. After an election marred by numerous cases of fraud, the
three opposition leaders tried to set in motion what they called “unity in defeat.” They
intended to contest the election results through mass action but their disagreements re-
emerged  and  the  rallies  ended,  especially  because  O.  Odinga  quickly  negotiated  a
cooperation mechanism with the government.  Legal petitions were also launched but
they were pointless in a country where judges are on the government’s payroll (or of the
rich). After a few weeks, the challenge to the election results died out and losers sought to
prepare  themselves  for  the  next  elections.  Indeed,  the  political  system,  especially
parliament was so restricted that the opposition could hardly be accorded any role. The
practice was such that the winner took everything, leaving the loser with nothing.
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28 Influenced by the civil society, particularly the lawyers in the Law Society Kenya and
human rights NGOs, the opposition politicians were convinced that the Moi regime could
not  be  changed  without  constitutional  review.  The  incumbent  had  too  much  power
leverage and influence that it made competition unequal, and all the candidates did not
compete on a level playing field. From 1993, an active minority of lawyers, with massive
support from Catholic and Anglican bishops, held public debates on the desired content
of the next constitution. During this period, Christian institutions took in the streams of
persons who had been displaced following ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley, and this
deeply  changed  relations  with  the  political  leadership.  Leading  clergy  expected
constructive criticism of the regime from lawyers, who, on the one hand, explained the
institutional shortcomings that led to such dramatic autocratic ills,  and on the other,
recommended reforms.  Moreover,  leaders of  the mainstream churches were unhappy
with the political class. They thought the opposition was locked in ego wars and did not
particularly consider them as sincere democrats. Thus, between 1993 and 1996, political
professionals took little interest in debates on constitutional reform. But at the beginning
of  1997,  just  before  the  election  campaigns,  opposition  politicians  plunged  into  the
constitutional reform movement because they saw that the civil society could mobilize
crowds. In reality, the protests led by groups of lawyers were more to the point than the
rhetoric  of  elected  leaders  which  offered  nothing  new.  Residents  of  big  towns  were
convinced long before the politicians understood that institutions count and that change
would follow suit. In 1997, the regime conceded cosmetic constitutional reforms that did
not really change the power imbalance. Besides, the opposition proved unable to unite
just as in 1992, facilitating the incumbent’s victory.
29 Once again,  opposition leaders rejected the election results.  In his biography of Raila
Odinga, Babafemi A. Badejo gives a rather detailed account of the weeks that followed the
1997 elections.19 One of the presidential candidates, Michael Wamalwa, did not join the
rest of the opposition in taking action against the government. He immediately accepted
the official results. M. Kibaki, Charity Ngilu and R. Odinga initially planned to mobilize
supporters to disrupt the swearing in of the President. However, the plan did not work.
M. Kibaki made inflammatory statements in the media but no action followed, and on
6 January, Odinga recognized President Moi’s re-election. He particularly suggested ways
of cooperating with the regime and led his party LDP into government, then went ahead
to merge it with KANU. Rather than protest against the government, he cynically opted to
collaborate with the incumbent to promote his ideas on necessary constitutional reform
from within the government. Finally, the contentious results of the 1997 elections were
accepted by an opposition that was so increasingly frustrated that it found itself in a
position of helplessness in the face of targeted government-orchestrated violence. Thus,
militias basically attacked areas associated with candidates who intended to petition the
official verdict of the elections.
30 The 2002 elections took place with a radically renewed party system. KANU imploded,
thus  facilitating unity  of  a  large  opposition.  This  overturned political  landscape was
mostly due to activism by Raila Odinga, who jumped off the KANU ship a few weeks before
the elections. He joined the opposition, which won the election with a big margin. Uhuru
Kenyatta,  the  KANU  candidate,  quickly  conceded  defeat,  which  was  particularly
significant for both the presidential  and legislative elections.  Obviously,  elections are
contested only when the results are controversial and the race between the two camps
was very tight.
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31 This was the case in 2007. But why was R. Odinga, the opposition leader who so easily
conceded defeat in 1992 and 1997, so pugnacious and reluctant to accept official results in
2007? Why did he validate such a violent protest against the government?
 
The particularity of the 2007 elections
32 Once again, the party system had changed enormously since 2002. The development of
party  alliances  as  well  as  changes  in  organization  of  some parties  makes  it  easy  to
understand that in 2007, the opposition had more means and opportunities to resort to
violence (if the leaders opted for this strategy). First, the ODM, which crystallized after
the 2005 referendum, is commonly viewed in Kenya as an agreement to join majority
forces between the Luos, the Luhyas and the Kalenjins. Most ODM Kalenjin leaders built
up a large part of their political career within KANU during the Moi era. In the 1990s, they
often participated in the two waves of ethnic cleaning, without necessarily being the
brains behind it.20 They were part of a regional political system that unanimously rejected
the presence of people perceived as non-natives.
33 This vision of political life has until now been confined to the Rift Valley, but in this
region, it permeates numerous categories of the population. This ethnic nationalism of
exclusion is not only a matter of manipulation by the elite. It is an ideology that now
involves a lot of people. In the beginning of the 1990s, the initial research on ethnic
massacres  in  the  Rift  Valley  blamed gangs  of  youth manipulated  by  politicians.  The
populations on the ground did not seem to directly participate in the killings. On the
contrary, the early 2008 ethnic violence tried to involve as many people as possible.
34 The Luo and Luhya political  forces also had great  potential  to mobilize for violence.
R. Odinga attempted to build a party with the characteristics of a “movement” based on
the Ugandan model invented by Yoweri Museveni or the Rwandan model as structured by
Paul Kagame. The Kenyan context and the need to build coalitions limited R. Odinga’s
ambitions. Nevertheless, this inspiration existed in a more systematic and structural use
of youths than in other Kenyan parties. Thus, the youth in his camp were organized in
paramilitary  units.  Parallel  with  these  official  structures,  with  the  help  of  Luo
personalities,  the party funded militias of  vigilantes that patrolled districts in all  big
cities in the country where the Luo are dominant. They were also used to control the
votes  of  people living in the area.  In 2002,  R. Odinga had already set  in motion this
electoral strategy and it had begun creating tension with other vigilante groups.21 In 2007,
this unique network of militias in the big cities made it possible to immediately react to
the  announcement  of  election  results  that  were  considered  rigged.  However,  it  is
impossible  to blame them for  all  the ethnic  cleansing that  occurred in the slums of
Nairobi.
35 The Luo politicians were not the only godfathers of the militias. Among the leaders of
ODM, William Ruto was one of the founders of the Youth of KANU ‘92, and one of the
sponsors of Kalenjin warriors who organized the massacres perpetrated in Eldoret South
in 1992–1993. Fred Gumo, the Westlands MP, for a long time controlled the Jeshi la Mzee.
W. Ruto and F. Gumo were part of the small minority of big men who had the means to
permanently have militias at their disposal. The other politicians only recruited these
groups of youth during the election period to ensure security at their rallies and their
movement in the constituency. Thus, the culture of militias permeated the political class
in the two camps. However, the incumbent or at least top government leadership spent a
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lot of energy in 2007 trying to weaken the main force of youths in their ethnic group.
They actually persecuted Mungiki, thinking that they would not need its services like
they had during previous elections, since they controlled the police force from 2002. This
calculation proved to be wrong because their community was less organized to counter
the violence that broke out shortly after the election results were announced.
36 The opposition therefore had a vast  repertoire of  options in 2007 as  opposed to the
previous elections. Resorting to violence was one of the options at its disposal. In early
January 2008, Martha Wangari Karua, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and
close advisor to the head of state admitted during an interview with BBC programme
HardTalk that the government had predicted that ODM “could plan violence if they lost” but
she  expressed  surprise  at  the  “magnitude”  of  the  reaction  and that  it  amounted to
“ethnic cleansing.” The incumbent thought that State monopoly of power would protect
them and would enable them to act with impunity. They had underestimated the new
opposition forces. This was particularly manifest in the Rift Valley Province.
 
Election violence in the Rift Valley
37 All  analysts  stressed  that  election  violence  is  a  recurrent  problem  in  Kenya’s
democratization process. It is intimately linked to land policies of the post-colonial State,
particularly those of the first president, J. Kenyatta. He allocated large tracts of land in
the  Rift  Valley22 to  members  of  his  ethnic  group,  the  Kikuyu,  who  have  since  been
considered as intruders.  Nevertheless,  the presence in the Rift  Valley of  the Kikuyu,
alongside the Kisii, the Luo and the Luhya is not a recipe for violence until tension is
sparked off by State actions, with the behaviour of the administrators often construed as
provocation. The other necessary ingredient is cynicism of some politicians who fuel the
resentment  and finance  gangs  that  are  ready to  slaughter  the  targeted people.  This
section will determine the structural dynamics that fuelled election violence both before
and after the elections.
 
Tension zones
38 The 2007 election campaigns have currently been portrayed as having been more violent
than the 2002 campaigns, which were the most peaceful of the multi-party era. The Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) 23 reports showed that about 70 people
died from July, whereas in 2002, 325 Kenyans lost their lives in political tension. To put
the KNCHR figures in perspective, it should be remembered that it does not use the same
criteria used by other human rights NGOs in assessing election violence. It only keeps
records of violence that occurs around election-linked events (rallies, demonstrations,
primaries…).  This  very  narrow definition  excludes  the  most  heinous  violence  of  the
period that precedes the elections. Thus, the very high numbers of deaths in Mount Elgon
(close to 600 and 150,000 displaced persons since the end of 2006) are not accounted for.
Some 500 youths killed in 2007 by the police in the fight against Mungiki as well as scores
of  murders  committed by members  of  this  militia  group are not  part  of  the KNCHR
analysis.
39 Regardless  of  these  two  large  tension  zones  where  conflict  was  already  intense
throughout 2007, there were visible crisis areas where violence started as part of the
election  campaigns  before  really  exploding  after  the  elections.  This  geography  of
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massacres is familiar as it is similar to the ethnic cleansing perpetrated during the 1992
and 1997 elections.
40 Indeed, the 2007 election campaigns reactivated the usual tension areas in the Rift Valley,
some of them having been in existence since the Mau Mau crisis in the 1950s; some even
echoed the anti-colonial uprisings in the 1920s. This region is popularly known as the
smouldering cauldron of Kenyan politics. It would be perhaps more relevant to see it as
the black box of  the political  system because the problems facing this  zone are at  a
national scale. However, from a political analysis perspective, it is difficult to view the
Rift Valley Province as one whole. That is what John O. Oucho24 does when he stresses
that the province experienced the highest population growth rate in the country (after
Nairobi) due to massive immigration. He recalls that the Kikuyu had the highest amount
of  investment  in  the  region  and  that  their  dynamism  made  it  possible  to  develop
proximity trade as well as the agricultural sector. He identifies the general circumstances
that encourage aggressiveness of people that consider themselves natives of the region.
However, this large area of focus not makes it no easier to understand why conflicts break
out precisely at a given period and in specific places. Some areas seem more conducive
for these types of political strategies. Hence, it is worthwhile (at least concerning our
subject) to begin from the standpoint that the Rift Valley is not a homogeneous province,
neither from the cultural point of view nor in the political arena. It has to be seen as a
mosaic. Thus, the national politics are diffracted or articulated in this zone according to
very specific grounds and localized relationships.  To illustrate this,  it  is  necessary to
highlight one area of tension, Molo. This zone is only one of the hot points in the Rift
Valley because in 2007, relatively serious violence was also recorded in Laikipia, Trans
Nzoia, Narok, Turkana South, Baringo, West Pokot, Trans Mara and Kuria districts.
 
The case of Molo
41 Molo is situated in the heart of the Rift Valley Province. It is one of the main places
dominated by Kikuyu politics, which is often mistaken to be confined to Central Province.
This mistaken belief is due to long-standing reasons. It is particularly the Olenguruone25
crisis  that  captured the political  imagination of  this  political  field,  at  least  from the
Kikuyu point of view. In 1939, the state bought 52,000 acres in Olenguruone, land that was
at the time part of the Maasai Land Unit. This land was redistributed to squatters on
white farms, who had been rendered less as a result of mechanization. It was also at this
time when families that had lost land in the Kiambu region following the expansion of
white farms, were compensated. Those Kikuyu that had settled on neighbouring Maasai
land were relocated to this new site. This colonial programme of settling farmers caused
great frustrations. The administration refused to issue title deeds. The farmers found
themselves left only with tenant farming rights (ahoi). Given the type of farming they
practiced the acreage of land they were allocated was insufficient to live on. In fact, the
administration  sought  to  impose  on  them  some  crop  farming  methods  that  were
supposed to avert erosion, but the Kikuyus stubbornly refused to apply them. From then
on, the families never managed to live sufficiently off the land. This led to the colonial
authorities gradually evicting these families, who were then transferred to the Kamba
region in the 1950s.  It  was a radical means of countering the deep politicization and
mobilization of Olenguruone inhabitants. Indeed, since 1943–1944, most Olenguruone
inhabitants took a unity and struggle oath, which gradually spread to squatters of the
white farms of the Rift Valley and to the people of Kiambu South. Thus, mobilization
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among these farmers is commonly believed to be one of the main beginnings of the Mau
Mau26 crisis. The memory of this struggle still lives on. Several songs sung by the Mungiki,
a neo-traditional Kikuyu sect that unites a number of militias, speak of this crisis and
honour the fight by these ancestors. In reality, Olenguruone has for over half a century
symbolized what the Kikuyu consider the injustice of land ownership as imposed by the
State. These Kikuyu were denied the basic right to achievement as a Kikuyu man—that of
owning land on which to exploit his talent as he so wishes without outside interference.
They were also stopped from enjoying clear rights on their land. Thus, Olenguruone is
perceived as a story of multiple political obstacles that the State placed on their desire to
live off farming. It explains the numerous failures of plans to resettle landless peasants or
those who had been evicted.
42 Olenguruone did not stop the Kikuyu from returning to the Molo area. For a number of
families from Central Province, national independence meant opening internal borders so
that these peasants could try their luck where land could be bought. The Rift Valley was
thus the land of opportunity at the time since the Whites, who controlled a good part of
the  land,  had  left  the  country.  It  is  influential  people,  particularly  politicians,  who
benefited from the manna but in Molo the land was not very fertile. It attracted only
small-scale  farmers, who  mainly  cultivated  pyrethrum  in  these  high  altitude  areas
(approx.  2,500 metres  above  sea  level).  When  multi-party  politics  resumed,  this
immigration,  some  cases  of  which  were  old,  was  perceived  by  some  quarters  as
intolerable. In 1992, the first ethnic cleansing began but in this region where the Kikuyu
were very politically aware, this technique actually led to the election of good people. In
order to put an end to the excesses and pacify the region, the area’s political leader, John
Njenga Mungai negotiated with the government and crossed the KANU rubicon. In 1997,
he lost his seat—the Kikuyu voters blamed him for compromising. Dickson Kihika Kimani
was elected with 73% of the vote on a DP (Democratic Party, M. Kibaki’s party) ticket just
when violence was resuming.
43 Following their failure in 1992, Kalenjin leaders managed to hive off a section of Molo
constituency in 1996, which became a new entity that would be a “KANU zone.” Kuresoi
thus annexed Olenguruone that had been “cleansed” of Kikuyu farmers. Some came back
but most of the land had been repossessed at throw-away prices by the influential people.
This frustrated the landless Kalenjins. In 1997, Kuresoi was less affected by massacres
than Molo because the ethnic demography had already changed and the whole region was
traumatized  by  the  killings  carried  out  by  their  neighbours.  Added  to  this  was  the
economic depression that  had persisted following the initial  unrests  of  1992 (several
commercial sectors died out with the departure of the Kikuyu). In 2002, KANU won back
the constituency with only 47.5% of the votes. Mburu Mungai got all the Kikuyu votes
(21%) while the other five Kalenjin candidates were an indication of dissatisfaction of
voters. The 2007 elections therefore promised to be difficult and ethnic cleansing was in
the offing. By the end of October, some Kikuyu farms had been burnt and people killed.
The escalation of violence was swift as the Kikuyu retaliated and killed several Kalenjins.
In  the  tension  that  ensued,  some  Kisii  families  were  also  slaughtered.  Within  three
months, close to 25 people had been killed and 16,000 displaced (according to Red Cross
figures).  All  human  rights  organizations  that  carried  out  investigations  in  the  area
accused two politicians. Fingers were pointed at the outgoing MP, Moses Cheboi, who
after losing the primaries, sought to defend his seat paradoxically under the banner of a
dominantly Kikuyu party,  Safina.  His main competitor,  Zakayo Cheruiyot (ODM),  who
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44 Tension in Kuresoi is partly linked to the very delicate issue of the management of Mau
Forest. This massive highland (covering close to 400,000 ha; 36% of the country’s forest
cover) is one of the important areas in Kenyan politics. Multiple political problems adhere
to this area but the bone of contention is due to the fact that several communities are
fighting to enjoy this very fertile land. The Kikuyu, especially those who were internally
displaced the 1990s, see in it uncultivated areas; the Maasais do not want to lose their
political influence over the area as they had occupied it for a long time; the Kipsigis to the
west and the Kisiis  did  not  want  to  be  left  out  in  the  sharing of  the  spoils;  finally,
throughout  the  20th century,  the  Ogiek  (earlier  referred  to  as  Dorobo),  who  were
determined to live exclusively in forests were a pretext for tension with the State and
between the communities in the area. In the last few years, disputes have focused on the
State plans to resettle the Ogiek, which has led to mismanagement and land grabbing by
influential people and politicians.
45 In general,  three large and distinct zones of tension that persisted until  2008 can be
identified in this vast forest land.
46 First is Likia, which is situated in Mauche Division of Nakuru District. For two years, it has
been at the centre of violence between Kalenjin and Kikuyu militias. In 1997, 1,605 acres
of forest land was allocated to 318 Kalenjin families. The owners are generally absent and
they cultivate the land through relatives. Since the beginning of M. Kibaki’s presidency,
families of internally displaced Kikuyu in the 1990s have been squatting on parcels of land
neighbouring the forest on the grounds that if Kalenjins could deforest, they in turn,
could also illegally settle. In 2003, Lands Minister Amos Kimunya declared that all forest
inhabitants were illegally occupying public land. The Kalenjin families and the Kikuyu
squatters  were  asked  to  leave.  Negotiations  with  the  government  attempted  to  find
solutions. In the beginning of 2006, Kalenjin militias attacked the neighbouring Kikuyu
squatters. Two months later, the police expelled the two communities. Since then, the
clashes have increased with the former occupants determined to come back.
47 The second hot spot is eastern Mau. Towards the end of the 1990s, 24,000 ha of highly
fertile volcanic land were carved out of the forested area27 and close to 28,000 people
were settled on these plateaux.  In 2001,  the State degazetted this  part  of  the forest,
officially declaring that it was no longer forestland. But the number of farmers grew too
rapidly  and their  farming methods  endangered the  ecological  balance  of  these  hills,
which are the source of the rivers that flow into Lake Nakuru28. The government sought
to control this situation and this caused tension, leading to many deaths over several
years.
48 The third area is the Maasai Mau Forest, which experienced recurrent violence. In 2005,
close  to  10,000  people  (2,750  families)  were  evicted  by  the  police.  The  authorities
destroyed not only houses but also community facilities (schools, churches, clinics). The
police engaged in excesses that led to the explosion of the political situation.
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Fragile policy lines
49 Thus, it was easy to believe that the Kibaki regime was determined to control the land
situation in the country and put an end to the illegal occupation of public land. However,
this  policy  became  untenable  during  the  electoral  campaign  period.  In  2007,  the
government made some progress on its policy regarding forest squatters and it allowed
the evictees to return. Weeks before the primaries, the ban on the “shamba system” was
lifted. As a result, close to 10,500 people returned to Mau Forest. This directly conflicted
with the Maasai interests, made the Kipsigis jealous and disrupted the Ogiek lifestyle.
Some candidates in the elections did not particularly appreciate this influx of people,
which was hardly in their favour. It was impossible to rule out the recurrence of political
violence under such circumstances. In Molo District alone, a variety of tension areas can
be identified. They are supported by national dynamics (especially through State policies)
and by very local and often old-fashioned thinking. After the 2007 election results were
announced,  these  conflict  spots,  where  election campaigns  proved to  be  particularly
violent, experienced violence on a more vicious scale and tension reached its peak.
50 Obviously there were massacres in many other places from the end of 2007, but even
then, violence did not break out just anywhere. Shortly after the beginning of the crisis,
between 27 December 2007 and 3 January 2008, UNOSAT published satellite photos of fires
in the Eldoret area.29 During this first week, the most intense fires were reported on 1  
January.  A  look  at  these  documents  showed  that  the  violence  was  essentially
concentrated in two places, one of which is well known: Burnt Forest. In 1992, the first
ethnic cleansing of the multi-party era took place here. It targeted a Kikuyu settlement
set up shortly after independence on land formerly belonging to British farmers.
51 The numerous killings in Kalenjin areas were the result  of  ethno- nationalism which
radically shuns people perceived as non-natives who are out to loot wealth that belongs
to them. This ideology has recently been reinforced by two dynamics. The first is linked
to the policies implemented by the Kibaki regime on internally displaced persons, who
were victims of various waves of inter-ethnic violence. In 2004, United Nations agencies
estimated the number of these refugees to be close to 350,000. The Kibaki government
took interest in these people and attempted to set in motion a public welfare policy
through the development of 443 land distribution programmes. According to the Kibaki
administration, 232,225 people would have benefited from these plans.30 However, the
redistributed land was often in the Rift  Valley,  which was a major factor behind the
tension  with  the  Kalenjin  community.  This  latter  considered  the  measures  as  a  re-
colonisation of their land reminiscent of the Kenyatta era, during which several Kikuyu
families came to this province.
52 A second dynamic is the basis of the rejection ideologies. Towards the end of the 1990s,
the East African Tanning Extract Company (EATEC, which for a long time belonged to the
multinational company, Lonrho) placed back on the market several thousands of hectares
of good quality arable land. The State leadership (especially Daniel arap Moi himself)
amassed vast tracts of land at a good price. It provoked intense mobilization among the
local  people  and  a  young  generation  of  politicians,  who  took  the  mantle  of  Nandi
nationalism, and who were especially hostile to other Kalenjin sub-groups.31 Since then,
the other large group belonging to the Kalenjin entity, the Kipsigis, developed their own
nationalism.  These  young  politicians,  who  refer  to  themselves  as  “nationalists,”
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conducted an exclusion election campaign, which was a big success and most of them
were elected.
53 The  success  of  reformulating  these  political  identities  seems  to  have  crystallized  an
evolution in the methods of massacres in the Rift Valley. Reports on the investigations on
ethnic cleansing in the 1990s show that the killings were perpetrated by gangs sent out to
maim and kill. These youths were apparently from outside these areas. In 2008, the local
people were involved in the violence. They were called upon to fund the violence and
provide young men, notably with the help of pressure from elders. However, evidence of
this remains rather incomplete.
54 Whereas in 1992–1993, violence was confined to the Rift Valley, in 2008, the crisis took a
national dimension. Thus, several towns were affected.
 
Urban violence and killings by the police
55 Most of the towns in the country were affected by the election violence in very different
ways. Many slum areas were seriously affected by inter-community tension. Urban areas
also experienced brutality of the police force which often acted like social actors serving
one side. The policemen routinely behaved like faithful and extremely partisan allies of
the  ruling  class.  In  some  regions,  however,  they  did  not  appear  to  be  State
representatives  and  holders  of  power.  They  could  therefore  openly  support  the
opposition, including when groups perpetrated killings in their name.
56 Kisumu was one of the towns that was most affected by the election violence. In the days
that followed the announcement of election results, Kisumu wrote a new chapter in its
political martyrdom. In the Luo capital and the Odinga family stronghold, any impression
of stolen victory would have inevitably led to a popular uprising. For forty years, the Luo
people had cultivated a strong sense of frustration or persecution. They felt alienated
from  power  but  Odinga  rekindled  a  prophetic  hope  that  was  magnified  by  the
tribulations. Moreover, as a leader, he has always included the younger generation in his
political plans. R. Odinga is one of the very rare Kenyan politicians who considers youth
issues and takes them into account. While the political class considers them as social
cadets who must submit to the authority of elders and elites, R. Odinga considers the fact
that  in  Kenya’s  electoral  democracy,  the  youth is  an  important  majority  group that
always aspires to some autonomy, at least from the elders. Thus, he treats them like a
specific entity with whom legitimate dialogue can be engaged. Thus he enjoys enormous
popularity among the youth in the Luo community as well as in other communities.
57 As soon as M. Kibaki’s re-election was announced, the streets of Kisumu were flooded
with crowds that more than ever before needed scapegoats. The small Indian minority,
which was deeply engaged in trade and industry, saw their businesses and warehouses
looted. However, these families did not feel threatened and, apparently, none of these
important  economic  players  considered leaving the  area  or  the  country.  Apart  from
material damages, these popular protests resulted in many deaths, caused mostly by the
police.
58 During the first wave of violence, the police in Kisumu caused about a hundred deaths,
perhaps one of the biggest massacres of the crisis that followed the 2007 elections. It is
imperative to see in this the effect of the policy of brutality against the opposition on
which the government was quick to apply the infamous “shoot-to-kill” policy. This was
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typical of the police under the autocratic D. arap Moi era. The repression was bloodier
than planned because of the incompetence of the forces sent to Kisumu. The best trained
forces32 had  been  confined  to  Nairobi  where  the  authorities  wished  to  contain  the
situation and prevent opposition meetings at all costs.
59 These brutal acts by the police are symptomatic of a force in which most of the officers
did not  have appropriate  training and were assured of  absolute  impunity.  Thus,  the
Kisumu killings only added itself to the long list of the massacres perpetrated by the
police,  namely:  Garissa (1980),  Wagala (1984) where close to 500 Somalis  were killed,
Madogashe (1982), Bagala (1989), and Malkameri (1996).
60 Nairobi, the country’s capital also experienced several episodes of particularly vicious
violence. How did this begin? Is it possible to talk about spontaneous outbreak of armed
skirmishes or should specific responsibility be assigned particularly to policemen?
61 It  is  even more difficult  to know whether personalities,  especially  elected leaders  or
elders, caused inter-community tension in some parts of Nairobi. If this is the case, the
reasons could be varied. At the national level, opposition leaders played the violence card
as a means of  forcing the incumbent to negotiate without too much hesitation.  This
strategy had some effect in the capital city of Kenya to the extent that since the return of
the  multi-party  politics,  politicians  have  used  inter-ethnic  violence  to  discipline  the
middle class and force them not to cut ties with their communities in rural areas. In
Nairobi particularly, the middle class districts are too few to cater for the salaried masses
that no longer consider themselves as part of the popular classes. Quite often, they live in
houses within slum areas where the shacks, cardboard and plastic houses stand alongside
very decent houses. All these Nairobi residents, who earn good incomes but could only
find accommodation in the slums, were increasingly forced to move to residential areas
where their ethnic group is dominant. Ethnic pluralism in the middle class residential
areas  was  not  the  case  in  the  slums,  where  it  was  reduced  probably  due  to  ethnic
cleansing brought about by the electoral crisis.
62 It  is  difficult  to  blame the massacres  in Mathare,  Dandora,  Kariobangi  on politicians
alone. The youth militias were also to blame. They were fighting for the control of the
lucrative security and ransom market, amongst many other possible rackets. The election
crisis made it possible to challenge the hegemony of certain gangs over certain parts or
streets of Nairobi. These gangs also used social tension within their areas, especially those
described by journalists  as  the “rent  wars.” 33 It  was  also  easy to  capitalize  on these
sentiments because home owners or landlords are mostly Kikuyu while the tenants are
generally from other communities.
63 A third social actor played an important role in the Nairobi massacres. Indeed, the police
were involved in several excesses like they were in Kisumu.34 The violence particularly
took place in Kibera,  located in the constituency represented by opposition leader R.
Odinga. The Kenyan police had long forgotten its motto, Utumishi Kwa Wote—Service to
All.
64 The Nairobi killings essentially took place during the first fifteen days of the crisis. From
mid-January,  an  uneasy  calm  was  apparent.  Some  militia  groups  emerged  from  the
tension strengthened, as was the case with Mungiki. After suffering several setbacks and
being evicted from some parts of Mathare, the movement was able to rearm, with tacit
protection from the police forces, which had hunted them down throughout 2007. This
neo-prophetic sect, surviving on its militia activities, sought to resurrect its activities in
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other  Kikuyu  towns  (particularly  Thika  and  Kiambu)  or  in  towns  where  Kikuyu  are
dominant (in eastern parts of the Rift Valley Province). “Between 23rd and 30th January, the
Kikuyu  militia  in  the  Rift  Valley  towns—Molo,  Naivasha  and  Nakuru—carried  out  ethnocide
targeting local communities:  Luos,  Luhya, Kalenjin,  and other minority groups associated with
ODM and, by extension, with violence against the Kikuyu elsewhere in the country”35, the Human
Rights  Watch  report  says.  Ben  Rawlence,  the  report  editor  in  his  document  and
interviews emphasizes the involvement of Mungiki groups. Numerous rumours circulated
that politicians funded the violence and some names were repeatedly mentioned.  An
example is Samuel Paul Kihara, a former parliamentarian, who is also said to have urged
the police in Naivasha to remain passive during the massacres and to stop prison warders
from intervening.36
65 Too much blame is perhaps directed towards the Mungiki, which is believed to have been
involved in many tension zones during the second wave of violence (from the end of
January 2008). Mungiki became a label whose name alone sent shivers down the spine.
This  organization  became  the  symbol  of  militia  culture  that  prospered  from  the
privatization of security throughout the country. Mungiki is the most famous militia in
the country but it also owes its success to its unique religious nature.37 It has assets that
could  enable  it  to  capitalize  most  on  the  post-crisis  situation  as  compared  to  other
groups.  This  is  because  the  outbreak  of  violence,  which  thrust  the  youth  into  the
limelight, also showed them their capacity to change the situation. Obviously, the issue of
youth will be a crucial stake in reconstruction.
 
Conclusion
66 Following  the  agreement  negotiated  under  Kofi  Annan’s  chairmanship,  the  violence
linked to the electoral crisis seemed to die down. By the end of February, there were still
some pockets of tension, mainly on the slopes of Mount Elgon and, more sporadically, in
the country’s arid areas in the north. In the Mount Elgon region, the establishment took
advantage of the recent respite to finally send available troops. The GSU, followed by the
army, occupied this region. On the Ugandan side, the army tried to close the border and
arrested youths who were then handed over to Kenya. This new understanding between
the two countries38 temporarily put an end to the excesses perpetrated by the Sabaot
Land Defence Forces (SLDF). However, the guerrilla forces remain intact and no political
solution has been negotiated yet.
67 The entire northern Kenya semi-desert area also experienced tension linked to the effects
of a persistent drought and a near-famine in several areas.  As usual,  these economic
conditions caused many armed clashes. But in these regions, it was difficult to clearly
distinguish the “usual” violence from those linked to the elections. From February 2008,
the three Laikipia districts experienced clashes between Kikuyu farmers and the groups
of Turkana and Tugen pastoralists in search of pasture. However, some quarters believe
the  theft  of  livestock  had  been  instigated  or  funded  by  politicians  trying  to  incite
violence.39
68 Nevertheless, one month after the ceasefire, the situation in Kenyan appeared quiet but
certainly  not  peaceful.  The  embers  will  be  reactivated  if  an  efficient  power-sharing
arrangement is not established. However, it has been observed that the two sides have
difficulty in coming to an agreement.
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69 There  is  still  no  historical  perspective  to  assess  the  effects  of  this  terrible  election
violence. What comes out clearly is that the ethno-nationalism of exclusion, that basically
seemed confined to the Rift Valley, has pervaded the entire political space in the country.
More than ever before, different communities have difficulty in cohabiting within the
entire area of Kenya deemed useful, meaning situated above 1500 metres altitude. The
idea of a nation has been cracked on all sides and the State has for a long time been
disregarded. But the strategy of rigging and violence brings obvious gains, in particular
for  the  top  elite.  Thus,  the  Kikuyu oligarchy,  previously  weakened by  the  election40
emerged from the crisis re-legitimized, at least within its ethnic community.
70 The situation is such that once the crisis is over Kenya is going to have to negotiate a
post-conflict  arrangement.  The cease-fire agreement already provides for transitional
justice measures through a commission charged with an inquiry into how and why the
electoral fiasco happened. In addition, a Commission on Justice and Reconciliation will
seek to  shed light  on the post-election violence.  These bodies  will  have difficulty  in
carrying out their work in a country disillusioned by the systematic use of such expensive
commissions, which ultimately have no impact.41 Kenyans find it difficult to believe that
leaders who perpetrated the massacres will  be taken to court.  The Kibaki regime has
clearly demonstrated that politicians are assured of absolute immunity. This tacit rule
even applies to opposition politicians. Without trying to predict the future, one can say
that the modalities of transitional justice depend on the nature and form of political
transition. The peace agreement provided for the resolution of the crisis through power-
sharing. Under these conditions, how can anyone contemplate criminal punishment for
political leaders who committed massacres? It is likely that the legal obligation and the
memory will be greatly limited as much as possible to enable former enemies to work
together.
71 The transitional justice and reparation measures are aimed at dressing wounds but they
are  not  designed to  end the causes  of  conflicts.  The Kenyan crisis  took the form of
eviction of certain communities accused of amassing wealth at the expense of others.
President Moi’s regime orchestrated (and manipulated) this ideology of exclusion, and at
the same time it implemented policies to help communities that were lagging behind to
catch up.  Thus,  a quota policy was practiced in the universities in order to facilitate
integration of youth from pastoralist ethnic groups. In the recruitment of civil servants,
similar measures were used to ensure equality of chances between ethnic communities.
However,  these  measures  were  perceived  as  politics  of  cronyism  and  patronage.
Nevertheless,  many  Kenyan and a  number  of  political  groups  recommended a  more
equitable distribution of the national cake between the different regions of the country.
72 Certain analysts interpreted the Kenyan crisis as a revolt of the poor against an extremely
unequal  economic system.  It  is  true that  Kenya is  one of  the countries  where social
inequalities are highest.
73 Experts engaged in debates that sought to answer the question on whether the rapid
economic growth in the last  few years  benefited everyone or  just  a  small  privileged
minority. The United Nations figures alone show that poverty increased during the last
three years of economic growth. Findings by government departments show the opposite:
“At the end of April 2007, a joint survey by the government and donors on the conditions of living
in the country revealed that levels of poverty had decreased from 56% to 46% and were still on a
downward  trend.”42 Apart  from disputes  over  statistics,  opinion polls  indicated that  a
majority of Kenyans felt that their conditions of living had not improved in the last few
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years. They are especially aware that there is a lack of collective solidarity mechanisms.
Families are not a perfect safety net. With the electoral crisis, the ethnic community has
once  again,  become  a  shield—albeit  with  imperfections—against  aggression  by  other
communities. There is a lack of social security systems. C. Ngilu, Minister of Health during
M. Kibaki’s first term in office, had recommended a basic health insurance, which ended
up  being  rejected.  Kalonzo  Musyoka  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  R. Odinga,  based  their
presidential campaign on a development program under a welfare State. The need for
social protection was thus at the heart of political debates in which we should see the best
of chances for safeguarding Kenyan citizenship.
74 The Kenyan crisis also brought to the fore a broad range of land issues. Both politicians
and analysts persistently recall that Kenyans lack land. However, this thirst for land will
never  be  quenched.  Half-hearted  land  distribution  programmes  only  serve  to  stir
fantasies and frustrations and the legal status of ownership appears more uncertain than
ever.  Hernando  de  Soto43 obtained  instant  influential  success  with  his  thesis  that
capitalism  has  failed  outside  the  West  because  the  right  to  land  ownership  is  not
guaranteed. He says that for development to take place there is need for property rights
that  will  give  small  entrepreneurs  incentives  to  play  in  the  market.  It  is  especially
applicable  to  the  agricultural  sector.  Property  rights  would  have  to  be  accorded  to
squatters, or at the very least legalize their status. His approach may appear simplistic
but it stresses the need to extend participation in a capitalist system to vast populations.
It  presupposes  fairer  market  regulation  in  Kenya.  Crony  capitalism,  which  often
characterizes economic practices in this country, is probably one of the worst obstacles to
equally distributed economic growth. However, streamlining the economy and affirming
genuine  property  rights  presupposes  a  State  where  there  is  predictability  and  far-
reaching reforms, especially in the judiciary.
75 The extremely violent nature of the 2007 elections showed that electoral democracy is
still very fragile. Politicians have embraced the values of this type of government with
many ulterior motives. It is therefore difficult for them to propose, in good faith, a social
contract that will sincerely question the source of its prosperity.
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9. According to the CDU, the method of hiring commissioners of the Electoral Commision
of Kenya (ECK) (presidential appointment) does not guarantee their independence. Since
1997, political pratice has been that the President consults the opposition so that election
Commissioners are considered acceptable by everyone. Kibaki did not respect this recent
constitutional tradition. It is now observed that the cheating during vote tallying could
not  have  happened  without  the  complicity  of  Commissioners.  Other  ECK employees,
casuals hired ahead of elections, also participated in the rigging. As early 2003, the CDU
had begun denouncing the abusive tendencies of these people, who are ill-trained and
hired through favouritism and nepotism. Anne Cussac revists these practices in a lengthy
paper.
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archive].
18. International Crisis Group, Kenya in Crisis.  Africa Report no. 137, 21 February 2008;
Kenya Human Rights Commission, Violating the Vote. A Report on the 2007 General Elections,
27 February 2008; Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets. Organized Political Violence and
Kenya’s Crisis of Governance, March 2008, Vol. 20, no. 1 (A).
19. B.A. Badejo, 2006 (chap.14).
20. Among the ODM MPs elected in 2007, only two were mentioned in the ethnic killings
of the 1990s.
21. H. Maupeu, 2002.
22. During the colonial era, the best land in the Rift Valley were reserved for Whites.
After independence, many British settlers sold their farms, freeing a lot of land in this
province considered Kenya’s bread basket.
23. Refer in particular to “Still Behaving Badly.” Second Periodic Report of the Election ‐
Monitoring Project, December 2007.
24. J.O. Oucho, 2002.
25. Olenguruone was until 2007 one of the 16 “divisions” of Nakuru District. It was carved
administratively out of Molo “Division” but Molo is the undisputed political centre of this
area. This is, especially due to the fact that it is the big town in this part of the vast
Nakuru  District  (17,188  urban  dwellers  out  of  the  31,935  inhabitants  of  the  Molo
“Division” compared to only 509 urban dwellers out of 32,030 inhabitants of Olenguruone
“Division” source:  1999 Census).  It  is  first  and foremost  an important  administrative
center along the Mombasa-Kampala railway. For some months now, Molo has become an
autonomous district which includes Olenguruone.
26. Refer to T. Kanogo, 1987 (chap. 4) ; F. Furedi, 1989 (chap. 3), for instance.
27. Any form of cultivation is prohibited in the areas recognized by law as “forest land.”
28. The gradual drying up of this lake has been attributed to this deforestation.
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29. http://www.unosat.org [Not available. Archive].
30. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre-Kenya, Continued conflict and displacement in
the Rift Valley, Special report, December 2006. Figures provided by the government should
be considered with some caution. Indeed, these resettlement programs for the internally
displaced particularly enabled Kikuyu tycoons to get rid of their large farms in the Rift
Valley and which were for now unprofitable and had lost resale value. Njenga Karume,
the defence minister is the first term of the M. Kibaki government, was apparently one of
the beneficiaries of this manna.
31. Kalenjin is an amorphous ethnic entity created by Daniel arap Moi and other leaders
shortly after the Second World War in progressive preparation for independence. Thus,
these Nilotic ethnic groups (principally the Kipsigis, the Nandi, the Tugen, the Keiyo, the
Marakwet,  the  Pokot  and  the  Sabaot)  came  together  to  avoid  marginalisation  in
negotiations between ethnic blocs. To read about the political efefcts of the EATEC affair,
refer to J.M. Klopp, 2002. This paper demonstrates the positive effects of reinvention of
Nandi nationalism. The 2008 massacres reveal the dark side fo this same ideology.
32. GSU (General Service Unit, paramilitary) forces have been trained in Israel and their
anti-riot gear has been provided by France.
33. M.A. Goux, 2003 ; P. Mbataru, 2003.
34. Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets, op. cit., pp. 32–35.
35. Ibid., p. 43.
36. The Naivasha prison is one of the leading prisons in the country. There are more than
500 prison warders. During the violence, the prison commandant ordered his troops to
take positions in the town. They were shot at by the police. In the interest of calm, the
correctional institution officers withdrew from the town and left behind one of the worst
massacres of the crisis.
37. For a more detailed analysis of Mungiki politics, refer to my paper in this collection,
‘The role of religious institutions.’
38. The Kenyan crisis underlined the Uganda’s economic dependence on its neighbour.
Y. Museveni was forced to negotiate solutions with the Kenyan leadership that would
enable the transportation of goods to the Great Lakes part of Africa to resume quickly
despite  the  number  of  roadblocks  that  were  erected on the  two main roads  linking
Nairobi and Kampala.
39. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), ‘Kenya: Tracing roots of conflict in
Laikipia.’ 31 March 2008.
40. In Central Province, only 8 MPs out of 29 were reelected. Several ministers were sent
packing  in  their  constituencies.  Kikuyu  voters  massively  voted  for  the  ruling  party
nomenklatura around the President.
41. After the return of multi-party politics, President Moi appointed commissions on any
sensitive matter. The reports were often not released or were released too late, as was the
case on the 1992–1993 ethnic massacres or the conclusions of the Kirima Commission on
devil warship.
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election.’  Online Africa Policy Forum,  22 June 2007.  URL:  https://www.csis.org/analysis/
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M. Chege’s synthesis of the report does not indicate which period the rate of poverty has
decreased from 56 to 46 %.
43. H.  de  Soto,  2000.  His  theories  were  acclaimed  by  a  variety  of  personalities  like
Margaret Thatcher and Milton Friedman.
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